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1 Introduction
Energy security, energy poverty and climate
change are three critical, interrelated global
problems that require urgent action. Energy
security concerns are compounded by the
increasingly urgent need to mitigate greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions, including those relating to
energy production and consumption. Trying to
secure these objectives simultaneously creates a
series of dilemmas and conflicts that some
countries face more acutely than others. As
Christian Aid (2009: 8) put it:
India perfectly illustrates the nature of this
challenge. While its middle class has full
access to modern energy services and
economic growth based on the high fossil fuel
based power systems, the poor are left with no
modern energy sources but have to face the
worst impacts of climate change.
The energy challenges faced by India are
considerable, requiring planners to address
energy access for India’s largely rural population,
energy security and the growing impact of energy
sector emissions on the global climate. According
to ‘India’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2007’,
India is the fifth largest GHG emitter in the
world, producing 4.7 per cent of global emissions,
of which approximately 58 per cent are produced
by the expanding energy sector (MoEF 2010).
India has achieved recent economic growth
without a proportional growth in emissions, but
has made a voluntary pledge to further reduce
the emissions intensity of its economy by 20–25
per cent from 2005 levels by 2020.
Against this background, India produced its first
National Action Plan on Climate Change
(NAPCC) in June 2008, a statement of intent by
the Government of India (GoI) rather than a
legally binding document, but a significant one
nonetheless (GoI 2008). It includes eight
missions on mitigation and adaptation, including
a National Solar Mission to install 20,000 MW of
solar-power generation capacity by 2022 as well
as to reduce energy consumption by 5 per cent by
2015 through domestic trading of energy
efficiency certificates, energy efficiency
standards, and labelling for example.
The NAPCC makes explicit India’s position of
prioritising its own development goals over
potential climate change mitigation co-benefits
and clearly identifies the ‘overriding priority of
economic and social development and poverty
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alleviation’ (GoI 2008: 5). Invoking arguments
over per capita emissions and emphasising India’s
right to development, it claims that:
… the principle of equity that must underlie
the global approach must allow each
inhabitant of the earth an equal entitlement
to the global atmospheric resource. In this
connection, India is determined that its per
capita GHG emissions will at no point exceed
that of developed countries even as we pursue
our development policies. (GoI 2008: 2)
These development ambitions include efforts to
provide ‘energy for all’ by 2012 in a country
where over 400 million people do not have access
to electricity and over 850 million people depend
on non-commercial biomass for cooking (IEA
2010). Meeting the fast growing energy demand
for poverty alleviation and for economic and
industrial development is estimated to require
current electricity capacity to almost double by
2017 to 300 GW, and more than double again to
778 GW by 2032 (Planning Commission 2006).
National dependency on coal as the primary
energy source is expected to continue, but
renewable energy has gained significance in
India with growing concern for energy security,
particularly regarding the limited availability of
(poor quality) coal reserves and a high import
dependency of oil (TERI 2006).
It is against this background that we situate our
analysis of the governance of clean energy in
India and in particular, the role of the United
Nations Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
India is second only to China in the number of
CDM projects it hosts, with 597 projects
registered as of December 2010, 22 per cent of
the global total, and an 11 per cent market share
in certified emissions reductions (UNFCCC
2010). But Indian CDM projects have also
generated the highest rejection rate by the CDM
Executive Board, mostly on the grounds of
failure to adequately demonstrate the
additionality of projects. Additionality refers to
the need to prove that the project would not have
been viable financially, or have been able to
produce the same level of emissions reductions,
without the project. It relies, therefore, on a
counter-factual assessment of regulatory,
technological and financial barriers to the
uptake of low-carbon (and carbon equivalent)
opportunities.
Given the success of the country in attracting CDM
projects and the scale of the challenges it faces in
tackling energy poverty and reducing GHG
emissions, it is unsurprising that the country has
been the subject of a number of studies on the
CDM. Previous research has assessed the
performance of the CDM in India against its stated
aims of GHG reductions and promotion of
sustainable development (Sirohi 2007; Castro and
Benecke 2008); the performance of specific
technologies (Kathuria 2002); forms of technology
transfer (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2009) sector-based
analysis, including of the energy sector, on which we
focus here (Dubash 2009; Bhattacharyya 2010).
There have also been studies exploring specific
policy approaches including unilateral CDM (Krey
2005; Michaelowa 2007) and comparative analysis
of firm and investor perspectives on engaging with
the CDM (Hultman et al. 2010). More directly
relevant to this study, some attention has been given
to ‘carbon governance’ in general in India (Benecke
2009; Newell 2010), while comparative work has
looked at how India’s Designated National
Authority (DNA), the main body responsible for
overseeing CDM projects in the country, compares
with that of China, the world’s largest recipient of
CDM projects (Ganapati and Liu 2009).
What is lacking is a more detailed understanding of
the actors, networks and coalitions that sustain or
frustrate particular policy initiatives, and of the
structures, institutions and modes of governance
that shape outcomes in the clean energy sector in
India. Our approach here is to emphasise the way
in which decision-making processes associated with
the CDM have to be understood in relation to the
broader configurations of political and economic
power in the energy sector of which they are a part.
Such configurations result not just from domestic
political arrangements and relations of power, but
also from the regional and global relations of power
in which India is embroiled and which shape what
is possible in the clean energy sector. Our aim then
is to advance an understanding of governance in
practice: the role of power, politics and decision-
making processes in shaping clean development
governance. To this end, we consider clean
development governance as operating across scales
(global to local) and across arenas (public and
private). The forms of power at play here are
material (control of production, technology and
finance), institutional (access to and representation
within key decision-making bodies) and discursive
(ability to generate dominant framings in policy
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discourse and the media). Conceived as such, the
CDM is one site of the wider politics of energy,
which it must engage and transform if it is to
realise its progressive potential.
2 Governing clean energy in India
In this section, we show how the way in which
international climate initiatives, including carbon
markets such as the CDM, are translated and
‘domesticated’ (Newell 2008) as a function of a
series of national characteristics, many of which
relate to governance. The process of developing a
workable policy instrument in a particular setting
is a product of key issues including: the degree of
autonomy and policy space that a country has to
negotiate terms with powerful state and market
actors and influence outcomes with international
organisations; the nature of its policy economy/
model of capitalist development (how state-led or
laissez-faire it is); and the structures of governance
that exist within a nation (the degree of
decentralisation, capacity and synergy across
levels of authority). In the Indian context, these
factors interact in a way which produces a unique
from of clean energy governance that is shaped by
a series of key factors.
First, there is the attractiveness of the Indian
market and the existence of – and critically a
perception of – a positive investment climate.
Leading banks such as HSBC have identified
India as an attractive location for investment
opportunities in the energy sector (Robins 2008;
AGCC 2009). This gives the Indian government
more leverage with actors hoping to enter the
market and sets India up to access a variety of
sources of public and private finance for ‘clean’
energy. There are vast opportunities and
substantial incentives to invest in the energy
sector through the CDM given the size of the
country and the scope for low-risk ‘low hanging
fruit’ investments, making India an attractive
location for CDM projects. Comparative studies
of CDM host country investment risk commonly
cite India as an attractive investment location
because of its established CDM institutional
architecture and regulatory environment, in
addition to the economic environment and large
mitigation potential (Jung 2006; Oleschak and
Springer 2007). Independent of the CDM, India
ranks as the fourth most attractive country to
investors in the Ernst & Young Renewable
Energy Country Attractiveness Indices (after
China, the USA and Germany), with an
increasingly favourable regulatory and policy
environment and a growing number of
entrepreneurs and project developers (Ernst &
Young 2010). The high number of CDM projects
in the energy sector in India may also indicate
the generic trend whereby flows of carbon
finance in the CDM market follow Foreign
Direct Investment patterns.
This places the Indian state in a positive position
to lever the private capital required to fund a low
carbon energy transition. Under the 11th Five
Year plan (2007–12), India has allocated US$850
million of public finance to support renewable
energy, with estimates suggesting that meeting
2012 targets will require leveraging as much as
15 times the budgetary support (Global Climate
Network 2010). According to Benecke (2010), the
generation of power from renewable energy
services is almost 90 per cent in the hands of
private parties, even if transmission and
distribution of electricity remains in state hands.
On this basis, she argues that ‘the CDM provides
an entirely new mode of governance for RE
[renewable energy] that departs from the
dominance of state-led steering’ (Benecke 2010:
9). The carbon market has opened up
opportunities for a new generation of
entrepreneurs seeking to finance and establish
projects as well as buy and sell carbon credits.
Indeed, the business press in India is replete
with stories hyping the potential of carbon
finance to get people rich quick, creating and
reinforcing a powerful discourse about the
enormous opportunity that carbon markets
present. Headlines such as ‘Corporate India to
earn Rs 2000 Crores’ (Financial Express 2010)
have helped to establish the idea that the carbon
market provides easy pickings for profit hungry
entrepreneurs willing to take a chance.
Second, and relatedly, is the proactive role of the
state in facilitating investment and creating
enabling regulatory frameworks in the ways we
describe below. There is a strong sense in which
the state still leads from the centre with missions
and state plans. Indeed, the Indian economy
remains highly regulated despite the neoliberal
reforms introduced from 1991 under the
stewardship of the current Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh during his term as finance
minister. The state still casts a long shadow over
all aspects of energy production, distribution and
regulation. Indian banks, a significant proportion
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of which remain state-owned, are the largest
financiers of energy projects. The State Bank of
India is now the most significant global financer
of energy projects, investing 95 per cent of its
power sector project finance loans in India
during 2009 (Santiago 2010).
The government has been proactive in
facilitating the conditions for the uptake of
renewable energy, a fact which means CDM and
carbon finance can play an additional
supplementary role – rather than decisive one –
in determining the viability of a project. The
Ministry for New and Renewable Energy (MNRE
2010), for example, provides financial and fiscal
incentives to allow renewable energy to become
competitive with other sources of conventional
energy in India. Measures adopted to stimulate
innovation and investment in the renewables
sector include: the REC (Renewable Energy
Certificate) scheme; feed-in tariffs; tax incentives
for renewables; concessional rates on customs
and excise duties for the import of capital
equipment; capital subsidies and concessionary
financing from India’s Renewable Energy
Development Agency, as well as exemptions from
electricity taxes and sales taxes. Many such
measures have been well received by investors. As
research by Emergent Ventures India shows,
‘even before taking carbon credits into account,
renewable energy projects in India are looking
increasingly attractive on a risk return basis’
(Kadakia and Acharya 2010: 14).
Third, India is characterised by a multi-level
governance structure, whereby the central
government, state government and Panchayats
(local government units at the village level) each
have an important role to play in the governance
of clean energy. As in many countries, there are
issues of capacity at the national level that affect
the ability to monitor the quality of projects, in
particular their ability to deliver sustainable
development benefits to host communities. A
combination of a reluctance to reject projects in
the race to attract carbon finance and a large
number of applications that have to be considered
at each meeting of the DNA leave little time or
inclination to probe the details behind claims of
sustainable development benefits, such as
employment, access to technology and local
sourcing, accruing to communities which host the
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Figure 1 Distribution of renewable energy CDM projects in Indian states
projects (interview material). A total of 28 per
cent of the CDM projects rejected by the
Executive Board worldwide originate from India
(42 projects), giving rise to concerns over the
quality of Indian CDM projects as well as about
the effectiveness or willingness of the Indian DNA
to screen poor quality projects before they reach
the Executive Board. Studies of the perspectives of
companies on the CDM approval process indicate
that firms perceive there to be a low risk of
project rejection by the Indian DNA (Hultman et
al. 2010). Critics claim this has resulted in
negative social and environmental effects
associated with particular projects such as that of
a CDM registered HFC-23 destruction project in
Gujarat (Ghouri 2009) or Jindal South West’s
steel industry project (Hannon 2009).
At state level, there is uneven take-up of
renewable energy projects across states within
India with similar resource potential. The unequal
spatial distribution of CDM projects at the
international level is reflected in the distribution
across Indian federal states. Although to date
nearly all Indian states host CDM projects,
project numbers and CER volumes vary starkly.
Figure 1 illustrates the breakdown by state of
renewable energy projects, which account for
almost two-thirds of registered CDM projects in
India. States with the highest number of
renewable energy CDM projects are Tamil Nadu
(167 projects), Maharashtra (158 projects), and
Karnataka (145 projects), while seven states are
not host to any projects at all. CDM project
distribution appears to be correlated with state
income level and factors such as resources,
industrial growth and governance type.
State level governance is clearly important and
some state governments are playing a catalysing
role in the development of renewable energy.
Rajasthan and Uttarakhand, for example, have
set up single window clearance for renewable
energy projects to facilitate rapid approvals and
clearances for such projects. The rapid
development of wind energy in India has mainly
been driven by progressive state-level legislation,
including policy measures such as renewable
portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs. Wind
energy installations have been developed
substantially in Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra,
which contribute 42 per cent and 18 per cent
respectively to the total installed wind capacity
in the country.
Below the state level, India’s Panchayat Raj system
creates space for local-level consultations and
participation in decision-making. In theory,
Panchayats could play a key role in facilitating
consultations on CDM projects, helping to assure
that the sustainable development benefits are
delivered in practice and performing important
monitoring roles where state capacity will always
be limited. In practice, when resources and
bargaining with powerful actors are at stake,
there are also dangers of corruption, buying-off of
local leaders and capture of revenues by Panchayat
leaders. Many project design documents do not
describe the consultation process clearly, and
either use formulaic language to describe a lack
of comments received on a proposal, or fail to
provide evidence that they have undertaken a
specific consultation process for the CDM at all.
Fourth, there are features of the policymaking
processes that strongly shape priority-setting and
the overall form and direction that regulation
takes. Strategy management for renewable energy
is designated to the MNRE, arguably avoiding
some of the common governance problems of
overlapping functions and duplicated mandates
across government (Liming 2007). This does not,
however, mean that energy policy is not subject to
competing agendas and uneven power across a
broad range of public bodies. These include the
Ministry of Power, the Planning Commission, the
Ministry of Coal, the Ministry of Petroleum and
Natural Gas, the Ministry of New and Renewable
Energy, the Department of Atomic Energy and the
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF).
The as yet unresolved issue of which ministry will
ultimately have responsibility for the
administration of a new National Clean Energy
Fund (to be funded by a small tax on the import
and national production of coal) is one example of
how competing priorities of tackling energy
poverty and energy security are played out
between different parts of government. In this
context, the CDM and other carbon market
opportunities are received into and transformed
by this matrix of power and bureaucratic politics.
Layered upon these conflicts are a series of
personal and high-profile disagreements
involving in particular, the Environment Minister
Jairam Ramesh and Shyam Saran, the Special
Envoy to the Prime Minister on climate change,
over India’s negotiating stance at Copenhagen
where Saran rejected Ramesh’s suggestion that
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India was willing and able to accept a voluntary
emissions reduction pledge (Deccan Herald 2010).
Ramesh has also become embroiled in conflicts
with the Ministry of Coal over rejection of some
major industry projects and the Ministry of Power
over the rejection of large hydro projects on social
and environmental grounds (Ramesh 2010).
Each of these aspects of energy governance in
India strongly shapes, albeit in different ways,
the nature of clean development governance: the
form it takes and its potential and limitations.
3 Beyond CDM
As already noted, the CDM and carbon markets
more generally are just one, in many ways very
limited, source of finance for clean energy. They
form part of a much broader and more
significant landscape of actors and financial
flows that affect the financing and regulation of
energy in India, as in many other countries. In
this case that landscape includes actors such as
the World Bank, Asian Development Bank
(ADB) and the Renewable Energy and Energy
Efficiency Partnership (REEEP).
In relation to investments in energy
infrastructure, the PPIAF (Public Private
Infrastructure Assistance Programme), a multi-
donor technical assistance facility, has a large
energy programme, of which India is the largest
recipient of investments (US$7 million across its
programmes). At a more significant level of
financing, the ADB has also been a strong
supporter of large-scale projects in the energy
sector. Among the largest single disbursements
in FY2009, the ADB committed US$700 million
to the Second India Infrastructure Project Finance
Facility, which will support infrastructure projects
structured as public–private partnerships (PPPs),
including the energy sector.
At a much smaller project scale the REEEP
currently has seven completed projects and 19
active projects in India. REEEP-supported
projects, through PPPs with other financiers, aim
to fill a niche in terms of the provision of credit
and finance, as well as access for pro-poor
renewable energy projects in India. Examples
include Information and Communication
Technologies centres run by solar panels, solar-
powered telephone booths and lighting systems
or solar-powered sewing machines which increase
productivity and hence incomes (Parthan 2007).
In terms of direct support for clean energy from
donors, the UN Foundation and UN Department
of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) have
supported a US$1.4 million project called
Commercialising Renewable Energy in India
(CREI) to support rural entrepreneurs in
southern India to provide energy services for
economically productive applications, while
RECOMM is a US$3.15 million project supported
by USAID to promote commercialisation of
renewable energy technologies in India, which
has provided technical and financial support to
over 30 enterprises and NGOs to set up
renewable energy businesses. In many ways, these
other forms of public and private energy finance
aimed at tackling climate change seek to scale up
or go beyond the reach of carbon finance which,
as the India-EU Dialogue document notes, is
‘piecemeal and subject to global and national
economic fluctuations’ (AGCC 2009: 15).
Multilateral development banks, in particular, are
hugely influential in India in terms of the support
they provide to energy infrastructures, promoting
PPPs in power transmission as well as renewable
energy generation. This currently dwarfs the
levels of finance for energy derived from carbon
markets and will continue to do so for the
foreseeable future, even if some of the proposed
efforts to scale-up carbon markets to include
sector-wide mitigation actions come to bear.
Moreover, large-scale loans to energy projects
based on fossil fuels have generated a great deal
of controversy. For instance, the World Bank-
supported US$4.14 billion coal-powered ‘Ultra
Mega’ 4,000 Megawatt power plant in Gujarat,
India will emit more carbon dioxide annually than
the nation of Tunisia according to the US
Department of Energy (Swan 2008). Such
investments clearly circumscribe the effectiveness
of government actions on climate change as well
as raise questions about the credibility of the
Bank’s promotion of itself as a clean development
bank through its Climate Investment Funds.
4 Conclusions
Approaching the issue of clean development and
clean energy from a governance lens has
provided, we argue, useful insights into the
nature and practice of (clean) energy politics. It
captures: (a) governance processes across scales
(global to local) involving a range of public and
private, state and non-state actors; (b) issues of
power and influence that determine the nature
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of clean energy governance and who benefits
from it. These derive from the access to
resources and material power that some actors
have, uneven access to key institutions and power
imbalances among them and the creation and
maintenance of powerful discourses about the
potential of carbon markets; (c) areas of un-
governance and active neglect such as the failure
to integrate sustainable energy and climate
considerations into mainstream project lending
or government decision-making.
Placing the governance of the CDM in India
within a wide context of energy governance and
politics has helped to understand the limits and
potential of the CDM as a mechanism to reduce
GHG emissions and deliver sustainable
development benefits. These relate to issues of
weak capacity, the challenges of coordination
across levels of authority and between different
bodies with authority in the area of energy, and
the fact that there are many more powerful
drivers of energy financing and governance than
the CDM such as the multilateral, regional and
bilateral donors and private capital. The analysis
suggests that efforts to improve the governance of
the CDM at the international level, as proposed in
Copenhagen and Cancun, or to improve national
level governance through efforts to enhance the
capacity of Designated National Authorities will
only go so far if not combined with an attempt to
identify and address other barriers to the uptake
of clean energy in India, as elsewhere, which run
deeper than carbon markets.
There are proposals to exclude countries such as
India from future access to the CDM in order to
steer carbon finance more towards parts of the
world that have, thus far, benefited least (such as
many African countries). It is therefore critical
that India engage carbon markets and CDM on
its terms in ways which advance other nationally
defined goals such as improving energy security
or tackling energy poverty, given the vagaries,
uncertainties and problems associated with
carbon markets. The challenge then for India is
to shift the focus from domesticating global
initiatives to globalising its own model of low
carbon development and ensuring its social and
environmental integrity.
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